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IN THE SUPREME C O U R T 
OF THE STATE OF U T A H 
J. E. BAGNALL, aka JOSEPH 
E. BAGNALL, and FLORENCE 
BAGNALL, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
UNITED PAINT AND COLORS 
COMPANY, et al , 
Defendant-Respondents. 
Brief of Defendant-Respondent 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case, in its overall context, involves an action 
for forfeiture of a real estate agreement and to quiet 
title to some 570 acres of land in the plaintiffs. The par-
ticular matter involved in this appeal involves respond-
ent's motion for summary judgment and the resulting 
decree of quiet title, quieting title as against the plain-
tiffs and in favor of the respondents to a portion of the 
land involved. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
An order of Summary Judgment and Decree of Quiet 
Title was granted in favor of United Paint & Colors 
Case No. 
13753 
1 
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Company (respondent) on March 26, 1974. The plain-
tiffs then moved to vacate the summary judgment and 
that motion was heard and denied by the Court on June 
25, 1974, and an order to that effect filed July 8, 1974. 
It is from the Summary Judgment and Decree of Quiet 
Title, and the Order refusing to vacate the said Sum-
mary Judgment that the plaintiffs have taken this appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants (plaintiffs) seek reversal of the Sum-
mary Judgment and Decree Quieting Title and seek to 
have the matter remanded back to the District Court for 
trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 1, 1952, a real estate agreement was 
entered into between Hannah Bagnall and J. R. Bagnall, 
as sellers, and Wallace J. Nyberg, Jean B. Nyberg and 
Grlenna A. Nyberg, as buyers. At the time of the making 
of the said agreement, Jean B. Nyberg was the owner, 
apart from any interest acquired by virtue of the real 
estate agreement, of an undivided one-half interest in 
140.15 acres of the land covered by the real estate agree-
ment. She held that interest as co-tenant with her brother, 
J. R. Bagnall, by virtue of a warranty deed dated Jan-
uary 30, 1939, by which Joseph F. Bagnall and Hannah 
Bagnall conveyed to the plaintiff, J. R. Bagnall, and to 
his sister Jean B. Nyberg (one of the purchasers under 
the real estate agreement) an undivided one-half interest 
in the 140.15 acres. (R. 55, 56) On March 3, 1962, Jean 
2 
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Nyberg, by warranty deed, deeded the aforesaid 140.15 
acres to Utah Valley Land and Development Corporation. 
(E.72) 
The deed purported to convey a fee simple title to 
the land, although Mrs. Nyberg had only the purchasers 
interest under the agreement together with the undivided 
one-half interest by virtue of the 1939 deed from her 
mother and father. On July 16, 1962, Suburbia Land 
Company of Idaho, one of the defendants named in the 
within action, took possession of the land and entered 
into a modification agreement with the plaintiffs. (E. 
56) About November 4, 1970, Plaintiffs commenced the 
within action in the Sixth District Court to recover 
possession of the land and to forfeit the agreements for 
non-payment. In March of 1971, Mr. Ronald C. Barker, 
attorney for the defendants at that time, filed an answer 
to the complaint and in defenses numbered 4 and 6 
alleged that the plaintiffs had failed to acquire and 
maintain marketable title to the property. After the 
filing of the defendants answer by Mr. Barker, and after 
at least one conversation between Mr. Barker and Mr. 
Merlin O. Baker, plaintiffs' then attorney, wherein the 
matter of Jean Nyberg's interest in the property and 
her attempted disposition thereof was discussed, plain-
tiffs, on May 20, 1971, obtained and recorded a quit 
claim deed to the 140.15 acres, along with all the 
other property covered by the September 1952 agree-
ment, from Donald W. Denton and wife. Mr. and 
Mrs. Denton had, at one time, been assignees under 
the real estate agreement and had subsequently assigned 
their interest under the contract. Also under date of 
$ 
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May 20, 1971, plaintiffs obtained a quit claim deed to 
the same 140.15 acres, along with all the other property 
covered by the September, 1952 agreement, from Jean 
Nyberg (now known as Jean Nyberg Shirk). Curiously, 
enough, it was not recorded until May 28, 1971. (B. 92-
94) Then under date of August 12, 1971, plaintiffs ob-
tained another quit-claim deed to the same property from 
a Mr. and Mrs. Mortenson who, at one time, had also been 
purchasers and assignees under the contract. And final-
ly, on October 5, 1971, Utah Valley Land & Develop-
ment Corporation, as grantor, conveyed the same 140.15 
acres by warranty deed to respondent, United Paint and 
Colors Company. (B. 72-A) 
Pre-trial conferences in this matter were long and 
involved, and the final session thereof was held Septem-
ber 29, 1973, and the pre-trial order was signed Novem-
ber 9, 1973. (B, 49-61) I t was not until the filing of the 
plaintiffs' Amendment to Amended Complaint (B. 45, 
46) that the plaintiff ever called into question the validity 
of respondent's fee title to the one-half interest in the 
140.15 acres. Bespondents thereafter counterclaimed for 
judgment and a decree of quiet title in themselves, (B. 
64-69) and for summary judgment in their favor. The 
matter was argued to the Court March 22, 1974. At the 
time of the hearing both Mr. and Mrs. Bagnall were in 
attendance. One of the matters extensively debated was 
the question of consideration paid by the Bagnalls for the 
quit claim deed. The plaintiffs and their counsel freely 
admitted to the Court the existence and the timing of the 
deeds from the Nybergs, from the Dentons and from the 
Mortonsons. When the Court asked them what had been 
4 
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paid for the deeds, including the deed from Jean Nyberg, 
Mr. Bagnall, took some time to answer and then stated 
that he had forgiven the grantors of any obligations 
which they had under the contract. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEED FEOM JEAN B. NYBEEG 
SHIRK TO UTAH VALLEY LAND AND 
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION IS VALID 
AS A MATTER OF LAW 
Appellant (Plaintiff) seeks to rescue himself from 
his own folly by calling into question the validity of the 
warranty deed from Mrs. Shirk to Utah Valley Land & 
Development Corporation upon the ground that the cor-
porate grantee, did not come into existence until some 20 
days after the conveyance was signed and delivered to 
Mr. Redmond, a promoter of the corporation who became 
the president after incorporation. There is no question 
but that the contemplated corporation was ultimately 
formed under the name of Utah Valley Land & Develop-
ment Company. Plaintiff has questioned whether that 
could be the same corporation since the name "corpo-
ration" as contained in the deed appears as "company" 
in the articles of the grantee. The record, as designated, 
by the plaintiff makes it amply clear that the Utah Valley 
Land and Development Corporation referred to in the 
deed was the same corporation as was ultimately incor-
porated under the name of Utah Valley Land and De-
velopment Company. (R. 72, 109 lines 15-20 et. seq.) 
5 
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Fletcher's Cyclopedia on Corporations, Volume 8, 
Section 3956, pages 278 and 279 states that "A person 
who conveys real property to an association as a corpo-
ration cannot avoid the conveyance by denying the cor-
porate existence of the grantee, and this estoppel also 
extends to persons who are in privity with the grantor 
as is seen in another section." (Emphasis added) He 
then goes on to say in section 3989 that: 
' ' The estoppel of a person dealing with a pre-
tended corporation to deny its legal incorporation 
also operates against persons who stand in his 
shoes, or, in other words, who are in privity with 
him. Thus it clearly operates as against his 
executor or administrator, or his heirs, and 
against one * * * to whom he conveys property 
which he has previously conveyed to a corpora-
tion 
The Utah Court has spoken clearly and concisely upon 
this very question way back in 1903. In the case of Santa-
quin Mining Company vs. High Roller Mining Company, 
71 Pacific Reporter 77, certain individuals by the name 
of Kirkman duly entered upon vacant mineral land of 
the United States and located the Silver King mining 
claim thereon. Subsequently they deeded the claim for 
$1.00 and 4,000 shares of stock in the proposed corpora-
tion to Santaquin Mining Company, a corporation which 
had not yet been incorporated. The deed was handed 
to W. H. West, one of the promoters of the proposed 
corporation with instructions to deliver it to the secretary 
when the corporation was formed. Thereafter, certain 
individuals representing the High Roller Mining Com-
ing applied for a patent on some mining claims which 
J 
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overlapped the property belonging' to Santaquin Mining. 
High Roller claimed that the deed to Santaquin was a 
nullity because it was executed before the grantee came 
into existence. The Utah Court stated: 
"A paper purporting to be a deed was made, 
signed, acknowledged, and placed on the public 
records before the grantee therein named (the 
plaintiff) had become a corporate entity. # # * 
After incorporation, W. H. West delivered it pur-
suant to directions, to J. A. West, the secretary of 
the company. It then took effect. It became eo 
instanti a deed and it then had every requisite re-
quired by law. * # * Is not the delivery the very 
essence of the transaction? Would it not be de-
manding a perfectly useless ceremony to require 
the owner of the premises to write, sign, and 
acknowledge another instrument to the same pur-
port? Clearly such a proceeding would savor 
strongly of the nonsensical." 
The Court goes on to say that "Both upon reason 
and authority we think it is established that the deed 
offered by plaintiff was prima facie a valid instru-
ment * * *." The Santaquin Mining case was relied upon 
in 1919 when the Utah Court again held that a deed was 
valid even though executed before the formation of the 
grantee corporation. The writer will merely refer the 
Court to headnote number 4 in the case of Beggs et al. 
vs. Myton Canal & Irrigation Co. et a l , 179 P. 984, where-
in the Utah Court stated that "A deed executed by one 
company to another before the incorporation of the 
grantee company was not for that reason invalid." The 
writer is unaware of any Utah case since that time 
which is in opposition to the principle. 
7 
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Clearly, then, under Utah law, the deed executed be-
fore incorporation becomes effective upon delivery and 
acceptance after incorporation. A 1907 South Carolina 
case is instructive on this point. In the case of Sumter 
Tobacco Warehouse Co. vs. Phoenix Ins. Co., Limited, of 
London, 56 S.E. 654, a deed made out to Sumter Tobacco 
& Cotton Warehouse Company was executed a few days 
before a charter was obtained by the grantee corporation. 
The grantee was actually incorporated as the Sumter 
Tobacco Warehouse Company, leaving out the word 
"Cotton" as contained in the deed. The warehouse was 
destroyed by fire and the insurance company attempted 
to avoid payment upon the grounds (among others) that 
the deed was a nullity because issued before incorpora-
tion of the grantee, and also because the name of the 
grantee was not the same in the deed as it was on the 
articles of incorporation. 
The South Carolina Court stated that " A Deed to 
a corporation made before the charter will have effect as 
soon as the charter is obtained, on the ground that its 
acceptance should be presumed as soon as the corpora-
tion is competent to accept it." (Emphasis added) The 
Court made the observation that it is the duty of the 
courts to give effect to deeds made in good faith rather 
than to destroy them on technical grounds. The court 
further stated that the slight change in the name of the 
corporation could make no difference. "To hold that 
the slight change in the name of the corporation should 
defeat the deed would be to refuse to regard the intention 
of all parties concerned for the sake of an attenuated 
technicality." See also 4 Thompson on Corporations, 
5114, 5115. 
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POINT Tl 
THE VALIDITY OF "Hir: UEI1D IS GOV-
•
;
- EKNKD BY FT.MI ; UV 
Plaint have erroiieoii>.ly implied that the ia\v of 
the State of California, where ihe deed wa- purportedly 
executed, should govern ihe interpretation and ( f!eet 
thereof. Such is definitely not the case. Jn Am. -\.f\ :M, 
Conflict of Laws, ^ 16 states as follow.-: 
"' Fmiii the general principles heretofore stated, 
if follows that all instruments affecting the title 
to real estate, no matter what their nature, must 
be governed, as to their execution, construction, 
and validity, exclusively by the laws of the state 
in which the real estate is situated. For example, 
if a deed is executed in one jurisdiction and the 
land lies in another, the requisites and validity of 
the conveyance are governed by the law of the 
jurisdiction where the land, is situated. Questions 
as to legal effect of a conveyance are also gov-
erned by the law of the state m which the land is 
situated.'J 
Section 17 <uiu--
is;So omnipotent is the lex loci rei sitae that 
it even governs in regard to the capacity of the 
person making the instrument, no matter what its 
nature. Therefore, an instrument will be ineffec-
tive to transfer title to land if the person making 
it is incapacitated by the lex rei sitae, even though 
by the law of his domicil and by the law of the 
place where the instrument is actually made his 
capacity is undoubted. The same principles apply 
as to capacity of the person who is to take, (Em-
phasis added) 
•9 
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It is abundantly clear, without belaboring the point, 
that it is the law of Utah that is to determine whether 
he deed is valid, and it is likewise abundantly clear that 
as a matter of Utah law, it is valid in this case. 
POINT II I 
THE TITLE OF UNITED PAINT AND 
COLOES COMPANY IS SUPEEIOE, AS A 
MATTEE OF LAW, TO THAT OF PLAIN-
TIFFS, J. E. AND FLOEENCE BAGNALL 
It is undisputed that Jean Nyberg held an undivided 
one-half interest in the 140.15 acres with her brother, J. 
E. Bagnall, as a result of a warranty deed from her 
father and mother dated January 30, 1939. Such interest, 
of course, arose prior to, and was separate from any 
claim she would have to the property as a purchaser 
under the 1952 real estate agreement. It is also undis-
puted that she conveyed her interest in that 140.15 acres 
of land to Utah Valley Land and Development Corpora-
tion by means of a warranty deed signed March 3, 1962 
(E.72). 
Another deed exists which also was signed by Jean 
B. Nyberg purporting to convey the same piece of prop-
erty together with all the other property covered by the 
September 1952 agreement, to Mr. and Mrs. Bagnall. 
This deed was signed May 20,1971. Finally, a third deed 
is involved dated October 5, 1971, by which Utah Valley 
Land conveys its interest by warranty deed to United 
Paint and Colors Company, respondent herein. 
V> 
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a is impossible for tin- plaintiffs, under [he circum-
stances in this case, to become1 bona fide purchasers for 
value so far as the subject piece of property is concerned. 
The whole warp and woof of one of the defenses to plain-
tiffs complaint, raised by Suburbia Land Company and 
others named as purchasers under the contract, was that 
Bagnalls had not acquired and maintained a good title to 
all of the land. As early as March 1:-H, Bagnails were 
made aware of such claim by means of llic answer filed 
by the defendants then attorney, Eonald (\ Barker, par-
ticularly in defenses 4 and 6. The Court, at the hearing on 
the Summary Judgment motion, was aware of much 
which is not revealed by sue record, including the exist-
ence of the unit claim deeds from th<! Dentons and the 
Mortonsons, the supposed considerate<» paid for tiiose 
deeds and etc., all of which showed etna! knowledge 
by the plaintiffs of the respondents claim *fi Mm property. 
In addition, Suburbia. Land Company, Sanpete Land 
and Livestock Company, and various of hers had been in 
possession of the land from 1(M\2 under various claims of 
right. Bagnall was aware of such and in fact joined them 
as defendants in his lawsuit to- forfeit the' contract;. It is. a 
general rule of property law that one who deals with 
properly in !he possession of a third party is chargeable 
with knowledge of everything which inquiry of the party 
in possession would have, or could have, revealed. Bag-
nails, in securing the quit claim deed from Jean knew un-
equivocally that Jean, was not in possession. Therefore 
they are chargeable with anything which an inquiry of 
the parties in possession would have revealed. The claim 
of the defendants had been all along that Bagnall did not 
11 
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have good title, and that Jean Nyberg had issued certain 
warranty deeds which constituted a cloud upon the title. 
An inquiry by Bagnall would almost certainly have re-
vealed that United Paint and Color was asserting a 
claim of ownership to the land. 
The Utah Court, in 1939, in the case of Meagher vs. 
Dean et al, 91 Pacific Keporter 2d. 454 on page 454 stated: 
"An open, notorious, unequivocal, and ex-
clusive possession of realty under an apparent 
claim of ownership, is constructive notice to all 
the world of whatever claim the possessor asserts, 
whether such claim is legal or equitable in its 
nature.' ' 
The Court further stated: 
"To establish the fact of notice of claim to 
land from possession thereof, it is not necessary to 
show that person to be affected by notice knew of 
possession, but if possession was of character re-
quired by law, and had sufficient notoriety, cer-
tainty and exclusiveness, the notice is a legal de-
duction from the fact of possession." 
"The possession of a tenant is the possession 
of the landlord, and hence notice of the possession 
of the tenant is notice of the possession of the 
landlord." 
"The possession of a purchaser of land under 
an unrecorded contract therefor is sufficient to 
put all persons upon inquiry as to his right, and 
they are chargeable with such knowledge of ven-
dor's title which they would obtain by such in-
quiry." 
"Whatever is notice enough to excite atten-
tion and put purchaser on his guard and call for 
inquiry is notice of everything to which such 
inquiry might have led." 
12 
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Bagnalls knew that parties othei tium Jean Xyberg 
were in possession. Having such knowledge, (here is no 
way they could escape the legal consequences of that 
knowledge. I t is a legal deduction that they are charge-
able with the claim of United Paint and Colors. The se-
quence of events leading up to the acquisition of the deeds 
by the Bagnalls from HIP Nybergs, from the Dentons, and 
from the MorltMisons, phis iho fact that the deed de-
scribes all !li<- !<IIM! covered by the September 1952 Real 
Estate Agreement makes it quite evident f Imf they were 
merely tying up loose ends of the huv.-uii and *=• *i :»;ir-
chasing property for any real consideration. The record-
ing statute was not enacted to protect one from deliberate 
nor intent inna) ignorance of the title. In the case of 
Pender vs. Bird, :>2-l KJd, 1057, the Lrtah Court stated 
that ; 
iirThe recording statute was w>t enacted in 
protect one whose ignorance of the title is deliber-
ate and intentional, nor does a more nominal con-
federation satisfy requirement that a valuable 
consideration must be paid, but the purpose of 
the statute is to protect one who honestly believes 
he is acquiring a good title, and who invests some 
..:•..;/. substantial sum in reliance on that belief." (Em-
phasis added) 
Clearly then, the plaintiffs ci'uhl MM hecnm** bona 
fide purchasers of the 140.15 acres bcean>e they had 
actual knowledge of claims by third parties (Utah Valley 
Land and also United Paint and Color), and even if they 
actually did not, they are chargeable with such knowledge 
because of the possession of the defendants, Suburbia, 
Sanpete and etc. They know that someone other than 
m 
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Jean Nyberg was claiming some rights in the land. That 
is sufficient to put them on notice of respondent's claim. 
The plaintiffs are further frustrated in their efforts 
to claim BFP status because of their failure to pay any 
significant consideration for the quit claim deed. It is 
their obligation to come forward, both at the time of the 
original hearing as well as now, with evidence to estab-
lish that they were bona fide purchasers. They have com-
pletely failed in any such proof. The affidavits of the 
plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Bagnall (R. 90-91, 95-96) do not 
mention any consideration whatsoever. They make a legal 
conclusion that they paid "valuable consideration" but 
they do not tell us what it was. It is clearly the preroga-
tive of the Court to determine whether "valuable consid-
eration" was given, and it is not bound by the affiants 
self serving statement that it was given. The record, then, 
even as designated by the plaintiffs clearly will support 
the trial court's determination that the deed to United 
Paint and Colors is superior to that of plaintiffs. 
In addition to the lack of evidence produced by the 
appellants, the response which they made to the inquiry 
by the Court as to what they had paid is even more damn-
ing. When asked, Mr. Bagnall, after some hesitation, 
responded that Jean had been forgiven her obligations 
under the contract. The Court will observe that she had 
absolutely no obligation under the contract at all. By 
bringing suit to forfeit the contract, plaintiffs had made 
their election. They could not, and did not, sue for any 
damages or deficiencies under the contract. Their remedy 
of forfeiture was complete in itself and no other remedy 
14 
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was available to plaintiffs against Jean. Furthermore, 
she had not answered, and her default had been entered. 
Under these circumstances, it is readily seen that the 
"valuable consideration" given by Bagnalls to Jean was 
absolutely no consideration at all. Add to this, the fact 
that the recording statute requires something more than 
nominal consideration to support a claim of bona fide 
purchaser, and it is again clear that Bagnalls could not, 
under any view of the pleadings and facts available to 
the trial judge, establish that they were purchasers in 
good faith. 
In modern practice a quitclaim, such as the one 
from Jean Nyberg to the Plaintiffs, is used where the 
grantor intends to convey only such interest as he has, 
in contradistinction to a grant of the fee or other estate 
with warranty of title. Such a deed is as effectual to con-
vey whatever interest the grantor has in the subject of the 
deed as is any other form of conveyance. It must be 
noted, however, that it will convey only such interest as 
the grantor actually has. See 23 Am. Jur 2d., Deeds, 
Section 291. 
In section 292 of 23 Am Jur 2d., it states : 
"All courts agree that a quitclaim deed, un-
less a contrary intent appears, passes all the 
right, title, and interest which the grantor has at 
the time of making the deed, which is capable of 
being transferred by deed, and nothing more." 
(Emphasis added) 
Further on, on page 324 it states: 
"Conversely, under a conveyance by a quit-
claim deed the grantee: can acquire no better in-
15 
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terest than the grantor had. If the grantor him-
self has no title or interest of the property con-
veyed, most courts hold that the grantee takes 
nothing under a quitclaim deed, and the instru-
ment is regarded as merely a release or formal 
disclaimer on the part of the grantor, notwith-
standing the use of additional words of grant." 
(Emphasis added) 
Again, on page 325 it is said: 
" In those jurisdictions where it is customary 
to convey by grant with express or implied war-
ranty of title, presumably the grantee will not 
accept a quitclaim deed unless the contract of 
sale provides that this form of conveyance shall 
be accepted by the purchaser. Accordingly, it may 
be said that a quitclaim deed carries with it 
notice of every defect which there may be in the 
grantor's title" (Emphasis added) 
The Utah Court has not decided the precise question 
of whether one who takes under a quitclaim deed can 
become a bona fide purchaser for value. Many jurisdic-
tions have decided this question though, and the decisions 
have admittedly gone both ways. Texas is illustrative of 
the decisions holding that the grantee under a quitclaim 
deed cannot become a bona fide purchaser and is there-
fore chargeable with knowledge of all prior legal and 
equitable titles, whether recorded or unrecorded. Numer-
ous Texas cases relying on the holding of Miller et al. 
vs. Pullman et al, 72 S.W. 2d. 379, have so held. In the 
case of Stonum et ux. vs. Schultz et al., 138 S.W. 2d. 
825, the Texas court at page 828 stated: 
. <<* • * rp^y
 s|.yj Would not have been en-
titled to protection as innocent purchasers, for 
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the reason that the residuum-like instruments 
under which they sought to claim this property 
amounted to merely a quitclaim of something 
that had already been conveyed away out of their 
chains of title; so that, even though they did pay 
value for those instruments, and despite that fact 
that they carried such warranty, they still could 
not qualify under them, as subsequent bona fide 
purchasers of this particular property for value" 
The law in Utah is similar to that of other jurisdic-
tions concerning the interpretation and effect of quit-
claim deeds. The Utah statutes make a clear and un-
mistakable differentiation between the two types of 
conveyances. 57-1-12, referring to the form and effect of 
a warranty deed states that such a deed, when executed, 
shall have the effect of a conveyance in fee simple to 
the grantee. 75-1-13, on the other hand, referring to the 
form and effect of a quitclaim deed, states that a quit-
claim, when executed, shall only have the effect of a con-
veyance of all right, title, interest and estate of the 
grantor. In Nix et al. vs. Tooele County, (Utah 1941) 
101 U. 84, 118 P. 2d. 376, Tooele County conducted a tax 
sale of certain property and conveyed it by quitclaim 
deed. It turned out that the County's title was defective 
and the purchasers at the tax sale acquired nothing. They 
then sued to get their money back. The trial court granted 
judgment for the plaintiffs and against the county. On 
appeal the judgment was vacated and remanded with 
instructions to dismiss. The Court stated on page 377 : 
"Plaintiffs' title is founded upon quitclaim 
deeds. Such deeds do not imply the conveyance of 
any particular interest in property. See section 
T 78-1-12, E.S.U. 1933, as compared with section 
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78-1-11, E.S.TJ. 1933. Plaintiffs acquired only the 
interest of their grantors, be that interest what it 
may.'7 (Emphasis added) 
In the case of Dowse vs. Kammerman, (Utah 1952) 
122 U. 85, 246 P.2d 965, the plaintiff Dowse obtained 
certain property by tax deed at a time when values were 
low. The consideration therefore was relatively small. 
He quitclaimed to the Doris Trust Company, apparently 
for a substantial consideration, and Doris Trust con-
veyed by warranty deed to the defendants. Years later, 
but a comparatively short time before defendants inter-
est would have ripened into unimpeachable title by ad-
verse possession, — when land values had trebled or 
quadrupled — plaintiff purchased the title of the record 
owners for a paltry sum, sued to quiet title against the 
defendant on the grounds that the tax deed was defec-
tive, and thereby attacked the very title which he formerly 
had and sold. He did not even offer to disgorge the 
amount of his unjust enrichment. Even in the face of the 
obvious unjust enrichment of the plaintiff, the Court re-
fused to depart from the long standing rule that a quit-
claim does not convey after acquired title. In other words, 
the plaintiff won because the quitclaim conveyed only 
such interest as he had at the time and his own after 
acquired title was superior to his previous quitclaim con-
veyance for value. The Court stated that the grantee 
must know that a quitclaim deed only passes the right, 
title and interest which the grantor then has, and cited 
78-1-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1943 in support thereof. 
This section is contained in the 1953 Code as 57-1-13. 
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Clearly, then, Utah would, and should, hold that the 
grantee under a quitclaim deed must take subject to all 
infirmities, recorded and unrecorded, in the grantor's 
title. The very nature of the quitclaim deed to the Bag-
nalls amounts to nothing more than a disclaimer by Jean 
and precludes the appellants from becoming innocent 
purchasers for value. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the facts and the 
record in this case clearly demonstrate that the judg-
ment of the trial court quieting title in respondents as 
against the plaintiffs was proper and should not be dis-
turbed on appeal. The deed from Jean Nyberg to Utah 
Valley Land was valid and effective, as was the con-
veyance from Utah Valley Land to United Paint and 
Colors. 
The quitclaim from Jean Nyberg to plaintiffs, com-
ing some nine years after Jean has conveyed by war-
ranty deeds to Utah Valley Land, was made with 
full knowledge by the Bagnalls that there were 
claims by third parties against the land, and the com-
plete lack of any meaningful consideration from Bagnalls 
to Jean negatives any possibility of them becoming bona 
fide purchasers for value. The record is completely lack-
ing in anything which would even imply that anything of 
value was given by the plaintiffs for the conveyance, and 
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there was nothing to be decided by a trial of these mat-
ters. Respondent was entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD L. MAXFIELD, for: 
MAXFIELD, GAMMON, ELLIS 
& DALEABOTJT 
28 North 100 East 
P. 0. Box 1097 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorney for Defendawt-
Respondent 
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